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Abstract 
This paper puts forth a Neo-Kaleckian open economy model of two countries in order to investigate 
adjustment of US-China external imbalances. First, a stylized fixed mark-up model is presented, and 
discussed based on graphical analysis. Second, we present estimates of bilateral income and price 
elasticities of imports. Third, we employ the model for simulation analysis. Specifically, we randomly 
distribute expenditure change across government, investment and imports and calculate the exchange 
rate change necessary to lead to an equal change in the bilateral external imbalance. Doing so 
repeatedly allows to estimate probability distributions of endogenous variable changes. 
 
Keywords: Neo-Kaleckian model of demand and distribution, global imbalances, simulations 
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Introduction 
Global imbalances, and specifically the large and persistent external deficit of the US on the one 
side and the large and persistent surplus of China on the other, have played a prominent role in the 
analysis of the Great Recession. Many—and certainly the deficit countries—believe that a reduction of 
imbalances should be part of a sustainable recovery. How can imbalances be reduced? And, can 
imbalances be reduced without a global contraction?1 
In a Keynesian model of the real side with demand-driven output and prices anchored by costs, 
adjustment of an external deficit must be driven by changes of nominal rates of exchange and domestic 
demand, and the resulting change in exports and imports, respectively. Either required change can be 
quite sizable; in other words, the output contraction required for external adjustment under a fixed 
nominal exchange rate regime is large. Similarly, the nominal devaluation required to force external 
balance with endogenous incomes can be large. 
This paper investigates both issues in combination. In a demand-driven model, correction of 
imbalances must involve an increase in expenditures in the surplus country and a decrease in 
expenditures in the deficit country. Suppose that these expenditure changes are of equal size in both 
countries. Will then the bilateral imbalance be reduced by the same amount? With a fixed nominal 
                                                          
 Rudiger von Arnim (corresponding author, rudi.vonarnim@utah.edu) is Assistant Professor at the Department of 
Economics, University of Utah, 260 Central Campus Drive, Orson Spencer Hall 339, in Salt Lake City, UT 84112, USA. K.P. 
Prabheesh is Assistant Professor at Department of Liberal Arts, Indian Institute of Technology Hyderabad. The authors are 
grateful for comments from Massimiliano La Marca and Lance Taylor as well as two anonymous referees. We have benefitted 
from many conversations on the topic with Korkut Erturk. An earlier version of this paper was presented at ASSA/AEA 
conference 2011. Comments from session participants are much appreciated. The usual disclaimer applies. 
1
 We will not review the literature on causes of global imbalances. See, for example, Eichengreen (2006), Ocampo 
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exchange rate and an import propensity less than unity, the answer must be no.2 Hence, the questions 
this paper asks are  
(1) what real exchange depreciation is necessary for expenditure decrease in US and increase in 
China to lead to adjustment of the bilateral external imbalance by the same amount, and,  
(2) how large the accompanying output changes are. 
Three different sets of factors are likely to determine the answer: (1) size, structure, and trade 
relations of the economies under consideration, which we address by using a two country Social 
Accounting Matrix (SAM); (2) income and price elasticities of imports in the two countries, which we 
estimate for US and China; and (3) the distribution of the expenditure changes across different 
autonomous sources of demand, which we address with Monte Carlo simulation methods. More detail 
on each follows, but let us begin here with a brief exposition of the model.  
A two country model 
Kalecki’s writings provide fertile ground for international economics, even if he often focused on 
closed economies. Recent decades have seen a number of important contributions to Neo-Kaleckian 
literature, both on closed and open economies. Early on, and in extension of the work of both Kalecki 
(1971) and Steindl (1952), Rowthorn (1982), Dutt (1984) and Taylor (1985) made the case for 
stagnationism—the possibility that increases in mark-ups and the concomitantly suppressed labor share 
of income lead to decreases in output. In other words, demand was wage-led. Bhaduri and Marglin 
(1990) emphasized that a modified investment demand function could, and indeed would be likely to, 
imply profit-led demand or exhilarationism. 
Similarly, Blecker (1989) suggested that a wage-led demand regime would be less likely in an open 
economy, due to the negative impact of real unit labor costs on external demand. Blecker (1999) 
presents an overview of open economy modeling from a Kaleckian perspective; the following section 
substantially owes to that chapter. Recently, Stockhammer et.al. (2011) have investigated a similar 
model empirically.3 
The condensed version of the model discussed in this section abstracts from the rest of the world, 
with which of course both US and China have important trade relations. For now, we consider only the 
                                                          
2
 The question can be seen through the lens of transfer theory. Assume the expenditure changes in the two countries 
implies a financial transfer from deficit (transferor) to surplus (transferee) country. The question then is whether the transfer 
will be effected; that is, whether the trade balance improves by exactly the amount of the expenditure change. If output is 
demand-determined and the exchange rate is fixed, it will always be undereffected unless it directly and sufficiently impacts 
autonomous expenditures on imports. A fully effected transfer implies that the transferor country finances the expenditure 
change with increased net export earnings. Since import propensities are much smaller than unity, the endogenous import 
changes following income changes can not be sufficient to that end. If, however, the transfer to a significant part directly 
affects autonomous import demands—which add to the endogenous trade changes—the transfer can be effected, and can 
even be overeffected. See Johnson (1956) for a relevant discussion.  
3
 Other papers have focussed on cyclical as well as financial issues. Here, we will do neither—the model is presented 
purely in terms of (real) flows. Moreover, the model is not scaled by the capital stock, and concerns only the medium run. It 
follows that the rate of utilization is endogenous, but does not have to be in the long period. For an early contribution to that 
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home country, and variables of the foreign country are primed.4 The price of supply   is an index of 
import and domestic factor costs. The index of domestic factor costs    is a mark-up on domestic 
nominal unit labor costs,  
              (1) 
where the mark-up rate is           and                      the profit 
share (and   the wage share);        the real (product) wage and       average labor 
productivity. Throughout the paper, it will be assumed that the nominal wage   as well as labor 
productivity   are exogenous. Further, the mark-up rate   is constant, so that prices      are fixed, 
but change with shocks to       and of course the nominal exchange rate  ;         is the real 
exchange rate. The nominal exchange rate   is quoted as the domestic currency price of one unit of 
foreign currency. 
Output is demand-determined. Labor markets do not clear, and with constant productivity and a 
linear technology, labor demand follows. The components of aggregate demand are consumption  , 
exogenous government expenditure  , investment   and net exports. Domestic sources of demand 
can be written as  
                (2) 
         (3) 
where      represents the savings function with        , and        the investment 
function with the distributive and output variable as independent arguments. 
Imports of the home country are of course exports of the foreign country, and vice versa. Net 
exports of the home country can then be written as  
                      (4) 
where         but         —meaning a rise in  , which is equivalent to a real 
depreciation (appreciation) at home (abroad), decreases (increases) real imports. The standard 
Neo-Kaleckian result applies: redistribution towards workers increases demand through the 
consumption channel, but decreases demand both through investment and net export channels. Which 
effects dominate determines the demand regime to be wage-led or profit-led. 
However, the focus here shall be on the two country demand interactions with a given mark-up 
(and, hence, a given functional distribution of income).5 In order to highlight the interdependence of 
demands, a two country model can be represented in income-income space. The graph is much the 
same as in Blecker (1999), just that the discussion there centers on home versus foreign profits. To focus 
                                                          
4
 An appendix details the equations of the full model, with the US, China and the rest of the world indexed country 1, 2 
and 3, respectively. Table 5 shows a symbolic Social Accounting Matrix (discussed as well further below), which might be helpful 
to quickly illustrate the accounting of the model. 
5
 The model is fairly straightforward, and to save space we leave a brief discussion of stability for the appendix. Here, it 
might suffice to say that the model is dynamically stable if both countries have positive multipliers in isolation; this result is 
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on what matters, prices and distributive variables are assumed fixed. 
Panel (a) of Figure 1 is drawn with two identical countries initially in trade balance. The foreign 
country’s real income    is denoted on the horizontal axis, the home country’s real income   on the 
vertical axis. The home income schedule has a positive intercept—effective demand autonomous of the 
foreign country’s income. The slope is the product of the foreign import propensity and the home 
multiplier. The foreign income schedule’s slope is the inverse of the analogous product. The dashed line 
    shows the combinations of home and foreign demands that correspond with balanced trade, 
given relative prices. For two identical countries in trade balance,     begins at the origin and has a 
slope of unity. Given    and the real exchange rate, any point above     coincides with a home 
deficit, any point below with a home surplus: the points above     imply higher home imports. 
Figures 1 & 2 about here 
Panel (b) of Figure 1 shows a real depreciation of home currency, which of course could emanate 
from a wage, price or distributive shock. The home income schedule shifts up, the foreign income 
schedule shifts left. The net demand effect of the real depreciation on home income is positive; in other 
words, the external demand response to the relative price change and the internal investment response 
to the implied distributive change are larger than the internal consumption demand response. The same 
story applies to the foreign country, with the inverse sign. Further, as drawn, upward shift of home and 
leftward shift of foreign are large enough in combination to render the depreciation conflictual.  
The balanced trade line completes the picture. It shifts up and rotates clockwise, since at the new 
relative prices only substantially higher home income, and the implied higher imports, can balance 
trade. As drawn, the upward shift moves     beyond the new intersection of   and   , so that the 
home country now generates an external surplus. 
Connecting the initial and new equilibrium signifies the often conflictual nature of international 
competition. Price and distributive changes benefit one country, and cost the other. In contrast, 
connecting the initial equilibrium and the potential new balanced trade equilibrium exemplifies how 
international policy coordination can buffer such conflict: A domestic demand expansion at home would 
shift the home income schedule up further, increase import demand, and lessen the trade off between 
home and foreign income and employment. 
The two panels of Figure 2 are drawn with US-China imbalances in mind. In panel (a), the dotted 
balanced-trade line     has a negative intercept and slope less than unity—the former due to the 
US deficit vis-a-vis China, and the latter due to the larger US import propensity. The initial equilibrium is 
to the left of    , signifying the US deficit, and the fact that a rightward shift of    and the 
associated higher imports could balance trade, given the real exchange rate. 
Now suppose the US dollar depreciates. As in Figure 1, the US’s income schedule shifts up, and 
China’s shifts left. The depreciation shifts the dotted balanced trade line up, and rotates it clockwise. As 
drawn, and not unlikely, the new intersection of the two income schedules remains left of the new 
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sizable bilateral deficit. 
An oft-discussed solution is to increase savings in the US. One way to do that is to decrease the 
budget deficit. The small dotted line suggests how that might play out. A decrease in US government 
expenditures leads to a downward shift of the US’s along China’s income schedule, possibly down to the 
new balanced trade line. Adjustment then has been brought about by a global recession. 
Finally, panel (b) of Figure 2 considers expenditure shifts. Let us distinguish between the solid 
initial income schedules, the dotted intermediate and the final thicker schedules. As in panel (a), the US 
is initially in deficit. Suppose now that expenditures are shifted from the US to China; in other words, US 
overall expenditures fall, and Chinese expenditures rise. As drawn, the US is still in deficit at the new 
intersection of the dotted lines. As mentioned before, unless significant parts of the expenditure shift 
directly affect autonomous expenditures on foreign products, this is the only possible outcome in a 
demand-driven world; and the size of the remaining deficit would be especially pronounced between 
the US and China, given their relatively small import propensities. 
What depreciation is necessary for the expenditure change to lead to a reduction of the bilateral 
imbalance by the same amount? Below, simulations are employed to give a rough answer to this 
question. Here, panel (b) shows the direction of required changes. After the depreciation, a new 
balanced trade equilibrium could exist at the intersection of the thick income lines, and the shifted line 
   . As drawn, the contraction of income in the US is not avoided, but it could be buffered; and the 
appreciation-induced downturn in China might be avoided.  
Bilateral trade elasticities 
This section presents empirical estimates for bilateral trade elasticities. The following three 
equations are estimated:  
                           
                      (5) 
                                         (6) 
                  
                        (7) 
In equation (5),    is the ratio of US real exports to China over imports of the US from China;   
is real income of US,    is real income of China and   is the real exchange rate. Similarly, in equation 
(6) and (7),       denote real imports of US from China and real exports of US to China, respectively. 
All variables are expressed in logarithmic form. Higher domestic income leads to higher demand for 
imports and hence lower the trade balance and therefore we expect that that          . However, 
with higher foreign income the trade balance improves due to high demand for domestic exports; hence 
          are expected. In addition, an increase of the real exchange rate (real depreciation of US 
currency) is expected to increase the demand for exports and decrease the demand for imports. 
Quarterly data over the period 1986:01 to 2011:01 were used to estimate the above equation.6 In the 
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 US goods exports and imports to and from China are from US Census Bureau. Unit value index of exports and imports 
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following paragraphs, we describe both ARDL bound testing and Johansen cointegration test to estimate 
the above equations. 
The ARDL bound testing approach to cointegration 
We use Auto Regressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) cointegration procedure developed by Pesaran and 
Shin (1999) and Pesaran et.al. (2001). The main advantage of this method is that this test can be applied 
irrespective of whether variables in the model are purely I(0) or purely I(1).7 The error correction model 
of the ARDL model pertaining to the trade balance is 
                                            
              ∑             
 
    
∑            
 
    ∑           
       ∑            
 
      .    (8) 
Pesaran et al. (2001) propose an F-test for the joint significance of all lagged level variables. If they 
are all jointly significant, then there is cointegration. That is the null hypothesis             
     is tested against an alternative of                . Pesaran et al. (2001) propose 
lower and upper critical values for the F-statistic assuming all variables are I(0) for lower bound and all 
variables are I(1) for upper bound. If the computed F-statistic exceeds the upper critical value, then the 
null of no cointegration can be rejected irrespective of the order of integration of the variables. 
Conversely, if the test statistic falls below the lower critical bound, then the null of no cointegration 
cannot be rejected. However, if the test statistic falls between the lower and upper critical values, then 
the result is inconclusive.  
Tables 1 & 2 about here  
Table 1 reports the results from F-test. Bahmani-Oskooee and Brooks (1999) showed that the 
results of F-test are sensitive to the number of lags imposed on each first difference variable and hence 
we carry the F-test for different lag orders, i.e. from 1 to 4, on each first differenced variable in the 
above three equations.8 The results show that calculated F-statistics are greater than the upper bound 
critical value in all the three equations i.e. rejecting the null of no cointegration.  
Having established the cointegration relationship, the next step is to estimate the long-run and 
short-run coefficients of the equation by using the ARDL specification. After imposing maximum of 4 lags 
on each first differenced variable, Schwarz lag selection criteria (SBC) choose the optimum lag as three 
while Akaike information criterion (AIC) chooses as four for trade balance equation. However, both 
criteria select optimum lag as one for imports and exports equations. The long-run and short-run 
estimates of three equations are given in the Table 2.  
The results show that all variables exhibit the theoretically expected sign in the long-run, except 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
to proxy US income (Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis). Similarly for China, GDP series is drawn from National Bureau of 
Statistics of China. Since quarterly GDP of China is available only from 1992 onwards, earlier data points are constructed using 
the GDP growth rate by Abeysinghe and Rajaguru (2004). GDP is deflated by the Consumer Price Index (Base: 2005=100) and 
seasonally adjusted. The real exchange rate is measured with CPI of China and CPI of USA respectively; price indexes are from 
International Financial Statistics (IFS). 
7
 The results from ADF unit root test suggest that all variables are non-stationary, i.e. I (1), except the trade balance, 
which is found to be stationary. 
8
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for the exchange rate in the export equation. The estimated income elasticity of the US obtained from 
trade balance and imports equations is in the range from -2.49 to -2.99. These estimates are statistically 
significant. Similarly, the income elasticity for China obtained from trade balance and export equations is 
in the range from 0.47 to 1.4 and are statistically significant—except in the trade balance equation with 
lag 4. Similarly, the exchange rate elasticities obtained from trade balance equations are 1.36 to 1.55 
and are as well statistically significant. Likewise the exchange rate elasticity of US imports is found to be 
-1.11 and statistically significant. Though the exchange rate elasticity obtained from export equation 
exhibits theoretically unexpected sign, it is not statistically significant. The second part of the table 
shows the short-run dynamics of the equation and the error correction term for all the equations are 
found to be statistically significant at the 1% level and has the expected sign. Based on the diagnostics 
statistics, it can be concluded that in the most cases the models pass all diagnostic tests, and CUSUM 
and CUSUMQ indicate the stability of the estimated coefficients across the same period.  
Johansen’s cointegration approach 
If the variables in the model are non-stationary and integrated with same order then the systems 
method of cointegration proposed by Johansen and Juselius (1992) helps to check for long-run 
relationship between variables. We employ this method to estimate export and import equations since 
we found that the variables in these two equations are non-stationary and integrated at order one I(1). 
Since this technique is widely known in the literature, the methodology is not repeated here due to 
space limitation.9 The trace and maximum eigen statistics for testing the rank of cointegration are 
shown in Table 3. The results of both test statistic provide evidence that the null of ‘None’ cointegrating 
vector can be rejected. However, both statistics could not reject the null of ‘At most 1’ cointegrating 
vector, implying that a unique cointegrating vector among three variables considered in export equation 
as well as import equation. Table 4 reports the implied long-run elasticities as obtained by normalizing 
cointegrating vector associated with exports and imports.  
Tables 3 & 4 about here  
The long-run estimates of imports equation show theoretically expected sign and statistically 
significant at 1 percent level. The estimated income elasticity and exchange rate elasticity of imports are 
found to be 3.09 and -1.75 which are higher than those obtained from ARDL estimation. Similarly in the 
case of exports, the income elasticity of China is found to be 1.21 and which is statistically significant at 
1 percent level. The exchange rate elasticity is found to be -0.15 and statistically insignificant. These 
results are consistent with the ARDL results.  
                                                          
9
 This method applies the maximum likelihood procedure to determine the presence of cointegrating vectors in 
non-stationary time series. If cointegration is detected, then normalized cointegrating vectors provide estimates of long-run 
relationship. Johansen’s cointegrating analysis involves estimating a Vector Error Correction Model in reduced form. Johansen 
has proposed two likelihood ratio statistics, the trace static and the maximum eigenvalue statistic, both of which determine the 
number of cointegrating vectors based on significant eigenvalues of the matrix of parameters. The trace statistic tests the null 
of r cointegrating vectors against the alternative of more than r cointegrating vectors, while the maximum eigen statistic tests 
the null of r against the alternative of exactly r + 1 cointegrating vectors. If the variables under consideration are cointegrated, 
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The overall empirical results from ARDL and Johansen’s cointegration tests suggest that the 
income elasticities of the US obtained from trade and import equations and of China from export 
equation are greater than unity. The implication is that US trade balance, imports and exports are 
income elastic. Similarly, the exchange rate elasticities of US obtained from trade balance and import 
equations are greater than unity, which imply that the US trade balance and imports are price elastic, 
whereas demand for US exports is price inelastic, since exchange rate elasticity of exports is less than 
unity (and the coefficient insignificant). These estimations already suggest that adjustment of US China 
imbalances would have to fall on US imports—either through price or income changes. Simulation 
results further below will add to this insight. Further, the sum of import demand and export demand 
price elasticities (in absolute terms) exceeds unity—Indicating that the Marshall-Lerner condition is met 
and devaluation of US dollar can be expected to improve the trade balance. 
Data, multipliers, and repercussions 
In a multi-country model with demand-determined output, demand shocks and policies in one 
country have an impact on aggregate demand in the other country, and vice versa. The relevant 
multipliers need to take repercussions between the two countries into account. How large are 
own-country and repercussion multipliers; or, in other words, what output changes are necessary to aid 
adjustment of imbalances? Quantifying multipliers of the simple two country model with fixed mark-ups 
sketched above will provide some rough results to this question. The data underlying the analysis in this 
and the following section is presented in Tables 6 and 7. To start with, Table 5 shows a one country 
symbolic Social Accounting Matrix (SAM), included here to collect symbols and demonstrate standard 
SAM features: Row and column sums are equal; rows 1 through 5 record incomes, columns A through E 
expenditures; row 6 reports savings of private, public and foreign sector, which is offset by capital 
formation in column F. See Pyatt (1988), Robinson (2003) and Taylor (2004) for standard discussions of 
the methodology. 
Tables 5 & 6 about here 
Table 6 is the corresponding two country SAM, with the rest of the world appended with its own 
foreign column.10 The columns for US and China show the firm’s cost decomposition, household and 
government expenditures, and foreign and investment account. Above the first dotted line, rows show 
firm revenue, and labor, capital and government income. Below, three rows in the three cost columns 
combine to the bilateral trade matrix. The last row, below the second dotted line, shows the flows of 
funds. Row-column consistency is satisfied; in order to save space, the household’s column corresponds 
to wage and profit income, and the foreign account’s column total equals the sum of imports across 
origins. 
Table 7 gives more detail. The upper part shows bilateral trade flows and balances between US, 
China and the rest of the world (ROW) in 2008bn USD. The US’s deficit with China amounts to 268bn 
                                                          
10
 The SAM underlying the model is an aggregated version of the SAM used in von Arnim (2010). The raw data stems 
from a number of sources, including UN SNA, BEA, IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) and IMF International Financial 
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USD, which is equivalent to about 1.9 per cent of US GDP; the overall US external deficit in 2008 was 
about five per cent of GDP. The matrix of import propensities are recorded in percentage points on the 
bottom left—and are, with 2.4 (US imports from China relative to US GDP) and 1.5 (China’s imports from 
US relative to China’s GDP), not very large. 
Next, public, private and foreign macroeconomic balances relative to GDP show the typical 
characteristics. The external deficit country has to run a corresponding domestic deficit, either in the 
public or private sector. The numbers here mask important differences between US corporate and 
household sectors, since the former has been in surplus for a while, and the latter accumulating large 
amounts of debt. In that sense, the twin that matches the foreign world’s surplus has been the private 
deficit in the US.  
Tables 7 & 8 about here 
Lastly, on the bottom right, Table 7 shows the multiplier matrix. The appendix briefly details 
derivation. The US’s own multiplier is 2.74, and China’s 2.02. A unit increase of autonomous demand in 
the US leads to an increase of 2.74 units of US GDP, but furthermore 0.13 units of China’s GDP. 
Analogously, a unit increase of autonomous demand in China increases US GDP by 0.08 units. These 
small repercussions suggest that expenditure changes will not only be undereffected, but can not 
contribute hugely to rebalancing. 
Simulations 
How then can rebalancing occur? This section presents simulation results. Before delving into 
things, we should briefly comment on the calibration. First, since the price-distributive system is 
“passive” with a fixed mark-up and fixed nominal wage, the set of behavioral parameters is limited to 
investment, savings and trade function. The domestic demand regime is calibrated to be wage-led. It 
seems appropriate to presume wage-led demand in current conditions. Demand will tend to be 
profit-led, if “costs weigh heavily on firm’s minds”—i.e., when the positive impact of reduced real unit 
labor costs on investment is sizable, relative to the negative impact of lower consumption demand on 
investment. High unemployment and stagnating wages suggests that cost factors are less important; 
slow growth suggests, on the other hand, that investment is demand constrained. Further, available 
cash flow and government policies have supported corporate and especially financial sector balance 
sheets, but households are still and will be for a while in the process of deleveraging—higher real wages 
would ease the pressure, and provide stimulus to demand. (That such increases in real wages are quite 
unlikely is certainly part of the dire predicament the US finds herself in.) Second, for a ‘baseline’ 
configuration (shown in Table 8) the trade functions are calibrated to the estimated elasticities 
discussed previously.11 We do, however, vary trade elasticities to conduct sensitivity analysis. More on 
                                                          
11
 The focus of the simulations is on the trade linkages and trade elasticities. As can be seen in Table 8, the 
distributive-demand calibration is chosen with equal parameters in both countries. That is not to argue that this must be the 
case, but in order to choose parameter values that are plausible, and broadly supported by empirical estimates. Importantly, 
while the savings differential is assumed to be the same, the aggregate private savings propensity differs drastically. The (gross) 
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that in a moment. 
A first illustrative set of simulations 
Table 9 presents a few selected simulations, mainly to illustrate the model and simulation strategy. 
To motivate these, we have to consider two different closures for international accounts.  
The first standard closure implies three endogenous trade balances and three exogenous exchange 
rates, i.e.             and            . Simulations 1-6 are subject to this closure, and are 
included to provide some insight on how the model works. The second closure takes the bilateral trade 
balance between US and China as exogenous, and the bilateral US-China exchange rate as endogenous. 
For this adjustment closure we can exogenously reduce the trade balance and solve for the exchange 
rate change necessary to bring that about. We discuss each in more detail:  
Simulations 1 through 4 demonstrate, first, the character of economic links between the US and 
China. An investment shock in the US has a very small impact in China. Second, real US dollar 
depreciation does little for rebalancing by itself. Comparing simulation 2 and 4, it becomes clear that a 
US wage increase is expansionary, but so is the depreciation. This result depends, as so many things in 
these numerical results, on the strength of the links between the US and China. Since exports and 
imports to and from the rest of the worlds are not price responsive, the overall effect of the wage 
increase on external competitiveness is limited. Similarly, a nominal wage increase in China (simulation 
3) is expansionary in the US, and contractionary in China due to the real appreciation and induced net 
export changes.  
Simulation 5 demonstrates that an expenditure increase in the US and an expenditure decrease in 
China—as expected—does not trigger a reduction of the bilateral imbalance by the same amount. A 
reduction of government expenditures in the US by the full amount of the bilateral trade deficit and a 
simultaneous increase of government expenditures in China by that same amount leads to sharp 
contraction in the US and expansion in China. The size of the shock represents about 1.8 per cent of GDP 
in the US, and about 5 per cent in China. Next, simulation 6 shows a trade shift of the amount of    , 
equivalent to $134bn—trade shift meaning that the full amount of the expenditure change falls on 
autonomous imports. As would be expected, this type of expenditure change leads to a US surplus 
vis-a-vis China. 
Last but not least, simulations 7 and 8—emphasized in bold—show the real US dollar depreciation 
necessary to reduce the bilateral trade deficit by the same amount as the expenditure changes.     is 
halved (so that column 4 varies slightly depending on what the denominator does). For 7, only     is 
shocked. Simulation 8 includes a public expenditure change by the same amount. Several results stand 
out. Due to the relatively weak linkages between the two economies, US dollar real depreciation against 
China’s currency is sizable. Correspondingly, the overall improvement in the US’s trade balance is 
limited, and so is the overall real depreciation of the US dollar. Lastly, and importantly, bilateral 
depreciation in combination with the expenditure shift does reduce the bilateral trade balance, and 
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Further simulations: Monte Carlo 
The key weakness of the calculations made in the previous section is that nobody knows where the 
expenditure shift might originate—presuming, of course, that it does in the first place. This section 
attempts to alleviate this problem through the application of Monte Carlo simulation methods. For a 
Monte Carlo simulation, a model is repeatedly solved—but each time with a changed parameter, initial 
condition or otherwise relevant exogenous input.  
Here, we randomly distribute the expenditure shock of half the bilateral US-China imbalance, or 
$134bn, across government expenditures and the autonomous components of investment and import 
demand. (Table 10 gives an indication of the involved magnitudes.) Across these three demand 
components, shares of the total shock must add to one. Hence, we (1) randomly pick two of the three 
autonomous demands, (2) assign random share values between 1/5 and 1/2, and (3) calculate the 
remainder to one for the last item. The procedure is repeated 500 times; and the model then solved 500 
times with these varying distributions of the expenditure shock. Panel (a) of Figure 3 shows the resulting 
probability distributions.12  
Figures 3 & 4 about here 
First, the top left distributions of Panel 3 (a) show that about a 15% to 20% real deprecation of USD 
is necessary to reduce the US trade deficit. The higher the US income elasticity of import demand, the 
higher is the required depreciation—since increased income from exports would then lead to a surge of 
imports. Overall, however, the magnitude of the US income elasticity of import demand has limited 
effect on the location of the distribution of required exchange rate changes.  
Second, the top right panel shows that the US price elasticity of import demand has a significant 
impact on required depreciation. This appears to be the case especially when the price elasticity is 
relatively weak. In contrast, the bottom left panel of Figure 3 shows that China’s price elasticity of 
import demand has no significant impact on required depreciation. Similarly—and for the sake of brevity 
the graph is not included—China’s income elasticity of import demand does not have a strong impact on 
mean or variance of the resulting distribution.  
Lastly, the bottom right shows probability distributions for growth in both countries. As can be 
seen, the US has on average positive growth (and some inflation), whereas China has on average 
negative growth (and some deflation).13 What drives this growth pattern? The reason must be seen in 
the relative size of the two economies and the particular trade links they have. In the simulation, the 
forcibly reduced bilateral balance requires a net export increase for the US and a net export decrease for 
China. The average net trade shock implies, however, a much larger negative (positive) change relative 
to base year levels of demand for China (than for the US). This negative (positive) change outweighs the 
domestic demand changes in China (US).  
                                                          
12
 The probability distribution functions are estimated with a (normal) Kernel Density Estimation (KDE) procedure. The 
bandwidth is chosen ad hoc, such that tails of the distributions are not “too far” from the lower and upper limits of the sample 
data.  
13
 The inflation statistics are probably of less concern. The key issue is that inflation in both countries is “imported,” 
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This result depends on the simulation structure, which assigns a significant amount of the 
expenditure change to fall on trade. Panel (b) of Figure 3 summarizes an additional set of simulations. 
The only difference to those presented in Figure 3 is that the shock to autonomous import demand in 
both countries is limited to not more than ten per cent of the total expenditure change. As can be seen, 
the required depreciation is on average larger. Correspondingly, growth in China (as in the US) is on 
average positive.  
To further illustrate the structure of adjustment, Figure 4 considers two more cases. Panel (a) of 
Figure 4 considers an “incomplete adjustment.” Specifically, the shock applied includes the reduction of 
the bilateral trade balance by ½, and the increase of expenditures in China by the same amount—but 
not reduction of US expenditures. Panel (b) of Figure 4 applies the reduction of the bilateral trade 
balance by ½, and the decrease of expenditures in the US by the same amount—but not increase of 
China’s expenditures. (In both cases, the trade shock is limited to 10% of the total expenditure change.) 
The results complement those of Figure 3: In all cases, the US benefits through the assumed increase in 
net exports, but the structural relationship of the two countries can easily generate adverse affects in 
China.  
Discussion 
In summary:  
 First, the particular required depreciation in any simulation is driven overwhelmingly by the share 
of the expenditure change that falls on autonomous imports: the higher this share, the lower the 
required real depreciation. This is not surprising, but indeed expected. 
 Second, however, if a relatively large (small) share falls on trade, China will tend to experience 
contraction (expansion), while the US experiences an expansion with large and small trade shifts. 
This result appears to depend on the structural trade relationship between the two countries.  
 Third, particular trade elasticities have overall limited effect on required depreciation, with the 
exception of the US price elasticity of import demand. A relatively low US price elasticity of import 
demand significantly increases required US real depreciation—the reason is simply that the vast 
majority of endogenous trade changes must fall on US imports.  
 Fourth, in these scenarios, expenditure increase in China is vastly more important to buffer 
contraction than expenditure decrease in the US.  
One can consider the question whether this last (fourth) change is in fact being enacted; simply 
through faster growth in China, and relative contraction in the US. As China’s economy matures and 
moves away from the heavily export-led growth model, the bilateral trade elasticity might rise, and the 
exchange rate would ‘naturally’ appreciate. Further, why would anyone assume the simulated shifts in 
demand patterns to occur? In fact, such occurrence could be considered unlikely, if only because the US 
and China are intertwined in a complex transnational global production network. The analysis here thus 
brushes over all sectoral issues, which are arguably of great importance. Indeed, China’s low bilateral 
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Moreover, past investments in manufacturing capacity might necessitate a relatively stable exchange 
rate to protect profit margins of both national and foreign investors for some time to come. In summary, 
the particular structural economic relationship between the two countries and its impact on trade, the 
bilateral trade elasticities and exchange rates consistent with profitability of existing capacity 
necessitates a gradual and slow adjustment. Adjustment, in fact, requires structural change in both 
countries, and thus cannot play out in the short run. (Randomly distributing these structural demand 
shifts across sources of demand tries to capture this issue.) Still, relevant policy changes include a shift 
towards tradeable production in the US, and a shift towards non-tradeable production in China. The 
former could come with a shrinking FIRE-sector in the US and renewed attention to manufacturing,14 
the latter with development of a social safety net in China—for example.  
The analysis brushes as well over all issues monetary. The US issues reserve currency and assets to 
the global economy, which necessitates US deficits for credit and demand creation globally. The 
implications, most simplified, appear to be two-fold: Suppose, for the sake of the argument, that the 
US-China imbalance were to be slowly reduced due to the expenditure, price and structural changes as 
discussed above; but that the international financial architecture remains unchanged. Then global 
growth would necessitate a US deficit with a different country (or region). Second, though, assume that 
the international financial architecture is reformed, in such a way as to change global supply of and 
demand for reserves, as well as their patterns of “recycling.” Then, possibly, US-China adjustment could 
come about without pressure for a new US deficit to emerge.15 Only a different—stock-flow consistent, 
financial—model can deal with such questions, and we believe that they should be addressed. But for 
our purposes here, we argue in favor of a sharp Occam’s Razor. The model used here treats the US just 
like “any other country”—not to suggest that that is what it is, but as an abstraction. Since, in the end, 
whatever monetary matters materialize, they cannot possibly obviate the fact that adjustment of 
imbalances in a demand-driven world would require expenditure and relative price changes.  
Broadly, our results are in line with other studies—while using a quite different approach. First, 
empirical studies indicate that the Chinese currency is undervalued between 30% and 50% against the 
US Dollar (Groenewold and He (2007), Wren-Lewis (2004)). Presumably, these estimates suggest that a 
50% of depreciation of US Dollar is required for reducing imbalances. However, depreciation of US 
currency leads to expansion in the deficit country (US) and contraction in the surplus country (China). 
Chinn (2004) also argued that the depreciation of US Dollar would have limited scope to increase US net 
exports. Hence it is necessary to have a realignment of growth trends, i.e., lower US income growth or 
accelerated foreign income growth—a point previously emphasized by Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005). They 
argued that reduction of the current account imbalance to a sustainable magnitude would require not 
just US Dollar depreciation but also a change in the level of expenditures. Unlike any of these studies, 
we propose a policy mix with expenditure changing and switching policies, based on a full 
                                                          
14
 FIRE: Finance, Insurance, Real Estate.  
15
 The global supply of reserves could be affected through emergence of new currencies, including the Euro and a (fully 
convertible) Yuan; the global demand for reserves could be affected through reduced necessity for emerging market countries 
to “self-insure” against balance of payments crises and resulting IMF conditionality. Discussion of these proposals goes beyond 
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macroeconomic (Neo-Kaleckian) model of the real side. Importantly, adjustment of imbalances does not 
have to place the burden on the US, the deficit country—indeed, might rather place it on China, and 


















anuscript          





This appendix briefly presents the equations of the model in more detail. Here, attention is paid as 
well to the rest of the world (ROW), which throughout the paper has largely been ignored. Further 
below, we briefly comment on stability. Price and distributive equations of the US can be summarized as 
follows. China’s equations are analogous, with the appropriate adjustments in exchange rates. The US is 
indexed as country  , China as country  , and ROW as  . Specifically,     is the US dollar price of one 
unit of China’s currency,     the dollar price of ROW currency.      for simplicity.    , the Yuan 
price of one unit of ROW currency, follows from the ratio        .  
                           (5) 
         
     
         
          
     (6) 
                  (7) 
                (8) 
                                          (9) 
                                     (10) 
The domestic price    of the single homogenous good is a mark—up on variable costs, and can 
be derived from the cost decomposition, where    is real supply valued at   ,    is real GDP valued 
at    ,      is the wage bill,        profit income, and    
       are imported intermediates from 
China, valued at the foreign price    converted into domestic currency units. Setting    
      
  ,the price of supply is a weighted average of domestic factor and import costs.     follows in 
standard fashion from the domestic factor cost decomposition, where                 and    
is the capital share of gross (pre—tax) income.           is the real wage and          labor 
productivity. Lastly, the US real exchange rate is a trade—weighted index of the bilateral exchange rates 
with China and the rest of the world. 
Demand equations can be summarized as follows. For brevity, these domestic demand equations 
are not indexed by country.  
          (11) 
           (           )        (12) 
                                      (13) 
           (           )        (14) 
The flow of investment is a positive function of profits and real income, where   represents 
autonomous investment driven by animal spirits, and all other notation is as in the main text. 
Distribution enters as well on the side of private leakage; where    and    are the savings 
propensities of profit and wage earning households. In a one—sector model, real consumption follows 
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    is deflated by the supply (or consumption) price  . The public (primary) balance is the difference 
between receipts and expenditures. Expenditures are exogenous policy variable, and with only income 
taxes included in the model, real tax receipts can be written analogously to the savings function. 
Assuming that both profit receiving households have a higher propensity to save and are taxed at a 
higher rate, savings and taxes responds negatively to redistribution towards workers, increasing the 
multiplier. 
Exports and imports are functions of relative prices         and demand     . The home 
country’s exports are of course the foreign country’s imports, and vice versa. For brevity, only US’s and 
China’s bilateral import functions are listed. Imports from ROW are functions of US and Chinese 
demand, and exports from these countries to ROW are exogenous.  
       
             (15) 
       
             (16) 
The income—expenditure identities for the US and China give two implicit functions,  
   (         ∑  
 
              )      (21) 
The partial derivative of these with respect to the incomes    gives a matrix  .  ’s main diagonal 
contains the inverse of the own-country multipliers; the off-diagonal items the negative of the product 
of bilateral import propensities and real exchange rates. Since   is non-singular, the inverse exists, and  
           (22) 
collects all multipliers, with    a vector of incomes and    a vector of autonomous demand 
changes. The bottom right of Table 3 is     in equation (22). Further, letting the time derivative of 
incomes    respond to excess demands, the fixed-price model will be dynamically stable if the leading 
principal minors of the matrix    alternate in sign, beginning with minus. In the     case, this is 
equivalent to the negative of the denominator of the US own-country multiplier, and the determinant of 
–  . Put more simply, the model is stable if both countries have positive multipliers in isolation. For a 
detailed discussion, see, for example, Gandolfo (2010), chapter 18. 
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Figure 1: Panel (a) shows interdependent home and foreign income of two identical countries initially in trade balance. 
Panel (b) shows income changes after a depreciation of home currency. Home income schedule shifts up, foreign income 
schedule shifts left, and the balanced trade line shifts up and rotates right. As drawn, the home country now has a trade 




Figure 2: Here, home and foreign country differ. The home country has initially a trade deficit. Panel (a) shows the 
effects of a depreciation: upward shift of home, leftward shift of foreign, and upward shift (and rotation) of    . The 
depreciation is, however, insufficient to produce balanced trade. A home domestic demand contraction, shown by the dotted 
bold line, could do that, but at the cost of a recession at home and abroad. Panel (b) shows the result of an expenditure change 
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Lag length 1 2 3 4 
Trade balance equation 6.81** 7.82** 7.71** 7.32** 
Import equation 7.11** 7.23** 8.28** 8.72** 
Export equation 16.85** 19.72** 21.23** 19.7** 
     
Table 1: The results of the F-test for cointegration among variables. Note: For trade balance equation, the critical bounds of the 
F statistic with constant are 3.23-4.35 at 5% level, whereas for imports and exports equation, the F statistic with constant and 
trend are 4.87-5.85; and ** denotes statistically significant at 5 percent level. 
 
 Trade balance Imports Exports 
  Long-run equation  
 Lag3 Lag4 Lag1 Lag1 
 SBC-ARDL [1,0,3,0] AIC-ARDL [4,0,3,0] SBC-ARDL [1,0,0] SBC-ARDL [1,1,0] 
Constant 35.78 [4.98]* 35.59 [2.02]** -30.11[-2.04]** -12.9[-2.89]* 
       -2.83 [-4.04]* -2.99 [-2.79]* 2.49 [2.40]**  
        0.47 [2.37]** 0.62 [1.26]  1.44[4.60]* 
         1.36 [4.64]* 1.55 [2.13]** -1.11[-3.66]* -0.13[-0.75] 
Trend   0.020 [2.78]* -0.005[-1.71]*** 
     
  Error correction representation  
Constant 22.81[3.97]* 7.69 [1.35] -12.85[-1.90]**** -9.98 [-2.69]* 
         -0.53 [-4.5]*   
         -0.65 [-6.21]*   
         -0.47 [-5.61]*   
         -1.80 [-3.44]* -0.64 [-1.89]*** 1.06 [2.17]** 3.5 [4.27]* 
      
    2.56 [2.05]** 2.33[2.25]**   
           1.49 [1.15] 1.57 [1.44]   
        
    4.05 [3.11]* 4.15 [3.79]*   
           0.87 [3.89]* 0.33 [2.55]* -0.47 [-3.03]* -0.10[-0.75] 
Trend   0.02 [2.78]* -0.004[-0.70] 
        -0.63 [-6.79]* -0.21[-2.86]* -0.42 [-4.95]* -0.77[-8.04]* 
Adjusted     0.33 0.54 0.18 0.45 
   
   3.54(0.31) 5.71(0.22) 1.1(0.75) 2.35(0.06) 
     
   1.00(0.80) 2.81(0.58) 0.06(.96) 5.79(0.05) 
     
   1.68(0.43) 3.7(0.15) 0.58(0.74) 0.55(0.69) 
CUSUM Stable Stable Stable Stable 
CUSUMQ Stable Stable Stable Stable 
     
Table 2: Long-run and short-run estimates from ARDL model.    
 and       
  are LM statistics for serial correlation, for ARCH 
effect at lag 4, and      
  is LM statistic for normality in residual at lag 2. *, ** and *** are statistically significantly different 
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number of CV(s) 
Trace 
Statistic 






 Import equation 
None* 51.34 42.91 29.26 25.82 
At most 1 22.08 25.87 17.13 19.38 
At most 2 4.94 12.51 4.94 12.51 
 
Export equation 
None* 37.32 29.79 23.14 21.13 
At most 1 14.18 15.49 14.14 14.26 
At most 2 0.04 3.38 0.04 3.84 
     
Table 3. Johansen’s cointegration test. Notes: CV denotes cointegrating vector and * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5 
percent significance level 
 
Variable Imports Exports 
Constant -51.96 [-11.1]* -9.85[-3.01]* 
       3.09 [8.99]*  
         1.21 [4.22]* 
         -1.75 [-3.38]* -0.15 [0.84] 
Trend -0.028 [-4.08]* -0.03 [-2.41]* 
Constant 0.02 [1.15] 0.01[0.37] 
            0.15 [1.55]  
         
     -0.20 [-1.93] 
           1.50 [0.69]  
        
     1.09 [1.15] 
           0.11[0.40] 0.14 [0.52] 
        -0.45[-4.75]* -0.61[-4.16] 
Adjusted     0.36 0.48 
   
   13.2 (0.15) 5.64 (0.77) 
     
   54.91(0.22) 187.9 (0.04) 
     
   5.45 (0.06) 2557.45 (0.00) 
   
Table 4: Long-run and short-run estimates. Note:    
 ,       
  and      
  are LM statistics for serial correlation, for 
heteroscedasticity and normality in residuals at lag 1, respectively. *, ** and *** are statistically significantly different from zero 
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(1) Output                        
(2) Wage               
(3) Profit                
(4)Government                     
(5) Foreign               
(6) FOF                               
(7) SUM                         
 




 SAM US           China           ROW 
  Costs HH Gov For Inv Sum Costs HH Gov For Inv Sum For 
Output   10130 3243 1316 1776 16465   1613 762 1206 1959 5540 2431 
Wages 9463         9463 2938         2938   
Profits 4940         4940 1824         1824   
Government   2300       2300   743       743   
US 0         0 71         71 1245 
China 339         339 0         0 867 
ROW 1723         1723 708         708 0 
FOF   1973 -943 747 -1776 0   2405 -19 -427 -1959 0 -319 
Sum 16465 14403 2300 2062 0   5540 4761 743 779 0   
  
Table 6: Numerical SAM. Summary of data on national income, bilateral trade data, functional distribution of income and the 
macroeconomic flows of funds in 2008 bn USD. The columns for US and China show the firm’s cost decomposition, household 
and government expenditures, and foreign and investment account. Above the first dotted line, rows show firm revenue, and 
labor, capital and government income. Below, three rows in the three cost columns combine to the bilateral trade matrix. The 
last row, below the second dotted line, shows the flows of funds. Row-column consistency is satisfied; in order to save space, 
the household’s column corresponds to wage and profit income, and the foreign account’s column total equals the sum of 
imports across origins. Sources: UN SNA, BEA, IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS), IMF International Financial Statistics, 
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Selected statistics                      
                          
                  Bilateral trade balances 
  Bilateral trade matrix   Bilateral trade balances rel. to row-county GDP   
  US China ROW Sum US China ROW Sum US China ROW Sum 
US   71 1245 1316   -268 -479 -747   -1.9 -3.3 -5.2 
China 339   867 1206 268   159 427 5.6   3.3 9.0 
ROW 1723 708   2431 479 -159   319 1.2 -0.4   0.8 
  2062 779 2112                   
                          
        Macroeconomic balances            
  Import propensities rel. to GDP       Multiplier matrix    
US   1.5 3.0   S-I T-G E-M     US China   
China 2.4   2.1 US 1.4 -6.5 -5.2 0.0 US 2.74 0.08   
ROW 12.0 14.9   China 9.4 -0.4 9.0 0.0 China 0.13 2.02   
Sum 14.3 16.4 5.1                   
                          
Table 7: Selected trade and macroeconomic statistics. The upper part shows bilateral trade flows between US, China and the 
rest of the world (ROW) in 2008bn USD and bilateral trade balances. Within-region trade of ROW is suppressed. The lower left 
reports import propensities, i.e. trade flows relative to column country GDP, and macroeconomic balances relative to row 
country GDP. Bottom right shows the multiplier matrix. Sources: UN SNA, BEA, IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS), IMF 





    
 
US China 
Domestic demand  
  Distributive elasticity of investment  0.2 0.2 
Demand elasticity of investment  0.4 0.4 
Savings differential 0.3 0.3 
   
External demand 
  Price elasticity of import demand -1.5 0.0 
Income elasticity of import demand 2.0 1.0 
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   Simulation results 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
    US         Bilat. China         
                            
    S-I T-G B GDP RR RR12 B12 S-I T-G B GDP RR 
  (Base year shares) 1.36 -6.55 -5.18       -1.86 9.36 -0.39 8.97     
                            
  Examples                         
1 US investment shock -0.80 0.53 -0.27 2.4 0.0 0.00 -0.06 0.13 0.08 0.21 0.5 0.0 
2 US 10% nom. wage shock  0.24 0.56 0.80 1.4 -8.0 -7.9 -0.27 0.32 0.22 0.54 1.5 1.9 
3 CH 10% nom. wage shock  0.01 0.06 0.08 0.4 0.8 8.4 0.10 0.38 0.11 0.48 -0.6 -7.9 
4 10% nom. depr. (USD/CYN) 0.01 0.06 0.08 0.4 0.8 8.4 0.10 0.38 0.11 0.48 -0.6 -7.9 
                            
  Expenditure changes                         
5 Public (B12) -0.34 0.91 0.57 -4.4 0.0 0.00 0.17 1.74 -4.10 -2.37 7.6 0.0 
6 Trade (B12) 0.60 1.82 2.42 8.8 0.0 0.00 3.12 -4.41 -2.86 -7.26 -15.1 0.0 
7 Reduction of B12 (by 1/2) 0.17 0.57 0.74 3.0 2.4 42.8 0.96 1.00 0.14 1.14 -3.8 -30.2 
8 … & public (by 1/2) -0.01 0.94 0.93 0.4 2.3 38.0 0.93 1.92 -1.90 0.02 0.5 -27.8 
                            
Table 9: Simulation results. The columns list the variables, beginning with macroeconomic balances. B12 is the US-China 
bilateral trade balance in US currency relative to US GDP. All balances are reported as the change in percentage points to GDP; 
i.e. -0.8 in simulation 1 for US (S-I) means that the private balance worsened by four-fifth of a percentage point relative to GDP. 
The following columns report growth rates of GDP and real exchange rates (RR). RR12 refers to the bilateral real exchange rates 
of the US vis-a-vis China. Simulations 7 and 8 are highlighted in bold face since these employ a different closure. See text for 
further details.  
 
 
Selected statistics on expenditure changes         
        US    China    
Y I G M12 Y I G M21 
14403 1776 3243 339 4761 1959 762 71 
-0.9 -2.5 -1.4 -13.2 2.8 2.3 5.9 62.9 
                
Table 10: Expenditure changes. This table presents selected statistics of the expenditure changes; the left part for the 
US, the right for China. The first row shows base year (real) values for GDP (Y), investment (I), government 
expenditures (G) and bilateral imports (M12 and M21). The second row shows ratios of the expenditure change 
(134bn, half the base year bilateral imbalance) to GDP for each country, followed by an even distribution of the shock 
across the components of demand. I.e., -2.5 for US investment means that 1/3 of 134 represents a 2.5 per cent 
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Figure 3: Simulation results: Real exchange rate depreciation required to effect a change of expenditures of half the 
bilateral US-China imbalance and GDP growth rates. The distribution of the shock is randomized across autonomous 
government, import and investment demand in US and China. Panel (a): All three shares can maximally represent 60% of the 
total expenditure change; Panel (b): The shock to autonomous import demand in both countries is limited to at most 10%. In 
the three exchange rate charts, the thick black distribution represents the baseline calibration. Top left: The black (dashed) pdf 
shows the same shock distribution with a lower (higher) US income elasticity of import demand. Top right: The black (dashed) 
pdf shows the same shock distribution with a lower (higher) US price elasticity of import demand. Bottom left: The black 
(dashed) pdf shows the same shock distribution with a higher (the highest) China price elasticity of import demand. Bottom 

















anuscript          










Figure 4: Simulation results: Real exchange rate depreciation required to effect a change of expenditures of half the 
bilateral US-China imbalance and GDP growth rates. The distribution of the shock is randomized across autonomous 
government, import and investment demand in US and China. In both panel (a) and (b), the shock to autonomous import 
demand in both countries is limited to at most 10%. In Panel (a), the US does not reduce expenditure; in Panel (b), China 
does not increase expenditures. In the three exchange rate charts, the thick black distribution represents the baseline 
calibration. Top left: The black (dashed) pdf shows the same shock distribution with a lower (higher) US income elasticity of 
import demand. Top right: The black (dashed) pdf shows the same shock distribution with a lower (higher) US price elasticity of 
import demand. Bottom left: The black (dashed) pdf shows the same shock distribution with a higher (the highest) China price 
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